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When discussing the issue of animal rights, a burdening lack of comprehensive 
textbooks becomes quickly visible. A comprehensive introduction to both the 
historical development of different conceptions of animal rights, as well as 
their philosophical and ethical backgrounds would be a highly valuable 
addition to the persisting discussion. That is the reason why the book by 
Dorota Probucka, entitled Philosophical foundations of the animal rights 
concept, deserves particular attention of both students and researchers, who 
place their interest in discussing animal rights.  
In her monographic work, Dorota Probucka introduces in the first 
chapter the notion of animal rights through a historical analysis of the 
development of the discussed issue, emphasizing the link between the anti-
positivist stand in modern philosophy of law and the notion of animal rights. 
As the authoress points out: “Basic rights theory is one of the modern, anti-
positivist schools of philosophy of law, which is widely evoked by the 
proponents of animal rights” (Probucka 2013, 40). As it is pointed out, the 
sympathy, expressed by the supporters of animal rights towards the basic 
rights theory, is due to the affirmation of existence of certain, basic, rights, 
which may be both human, as well as non-human. Thus, such an empowering 
and expanding notion grants the possibility to talk not only of animal rights as 
a human obligation towards non-human animals, but as an elementary aspect 
of a wider theory of justice. 
Discussing animal rights as a feature of the basic rights theory 
presents, however, certain limitations. Probucka asserts that the notion of 
basic rights had been fruitfully employed by different social movements, 
focused on eradicating legal and social inequalities, i.e. the suffragist 
movement, children rights movement, African-American Civil Rights 
Movement, and others. As Dorota Probucka points out: “What would be 
common for all these ideological struggles? Their first step should be to 
change the social perception of the issue” (Probucka 2013, 47). Still, these 
changes do not happen overnight; as shown by all of the aforementioned social 
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movements, their struggle proved to be prolonged and – often – susceptible to 
uncompassionate rhetoric of the status quo. Thus, the issue of animal rights, 
despite a vast philosophical and intellectual support, is still to be perceived as 
far from achieved. 
While discussing the general issues concerning the concept of animal 
rights, Probucka reconstructs – following certain proponents of animal rights 
– some analogies between human and non-human rights. One of the 
mentioned authors – Tom Regan – suggests that: “Both in case of humans, as 
well as non-human animals, basic rights should act as an analogy to a no-entry 
sign in traffic regulations” (Probucka 2013, 53). Probucka supports such 
claims, as she points to certain analogies between the historical development 
of human rights and the modern reasons for animal rights. Those analogies 
include i.e. confirming that both notions are „established on an indispensable 
link between ethics and lawmaking” (Probucka 2013, 58), as well as on 
assuming the teleological nature of both human and nonhuman animals. These 
analogies may be understood – as the authoress suggests, following some 
proponents of animal rights – as a proof that the notion of animal rights is the 
conclusive step in the historical development of basic rights inclusion of all 
those, who: “Fall under the category of weak and powerless” (Probucka 2013, 
63). This view, supported by Probucka, is not as evident as it may seem. The 
development of human rights – from the first to the third generation – is 
questioned by several philosophers and researchers, who suggest that the 
second and third generation of human rights constitute legal duties that 
promote an ever-growing impact of central, governmental factors rather than 
basic rights (see: Rahe 2010). The notion of an expanding role of political 
institutions is contradictory to what basic rights theories (including animal 
rights theory) assume is their pivotal point. The concept of rights is 
concentrated – as explained by Probucka – in: “Recognizing the primacy of the 
individual over the interests of the majority and upholding the integrity of its 
moral status” (Probucka 2013, 61). In consequence, the basic rights theory – 
as well as animal rights proponents – assumes a protective role towards the 
individual in his or her relations with other individuals, as well as the 
government. Thus, it would be a logical and practical inconsistency to affirm 
the expanding the role of political and governmental institutions towards the 
individual in order to protect him or her from possible abuse of power. This 
issue remains undiscussed by Probucka, who rather assumes that it is possible 
to perceive the animal rights movement as an expansion to the solidarity with 
those in need. 
A valuable addition to the issue discussed above may be found in the 
concluding part of the first chapter, which discusses the important difference 
between animal rights and animal welfare. As Probucka points out, the 
difference lies in the definition what is the main injustice, that non-human 
animals may suffer from humans. Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer – who are 
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evoked by Probucka as the most influential thinkers of the animal welfare 
movement – perceive suffering as the “fundamental evil” (Probucka 2013, 73). 
In consequence, protecting non-human animals from unnecessary pain and 
suffering would be the main goal of the animal welfare movement, achievable 
through modification of the current legal system. In opposition to the animal 
welfare proponents, the animal rights movement aims at wider and deeper 
change of both law and social mentality. Such philosophers as Tom Regan, 
Gary Francionce, and others, describe their position as “radical-abolitionist 
and compare their action towards liberating animals to the historical 
movement against slavery” (Probucka 2013, 71). The notion of animal slavery 
is widely discussed, suggesting that not only legal, but also moral changes are 
required in order to eliminate injustice. Probucka assumes the latter 
perspective, widely discussing possible critiques of ethical conceptions of both 
aforementioned utilitarian thinkers. The consequentialist orientation of both 
Bentham and Singer does not notice – as Probucka points out – the inherent 
value of any individual, be it human or non-human. In consequence, the 
utilitarian perspective leaves open the possibility to inflict pain or cause death 
to an individual, if his or her pain would be beneficial to the remaining 
majority. Furthermore, utilitarianism does not provide an unanimous view on 
such animals rights issues as, i.e. veganism. As emphasized by Probucka:  
According to Singer, the consequences of abandoning the 
consumption of meat would be globally better than humanity 
persisting on a carnivorous diet. On the other hand, utilitarian 
thinker and opponent of vegetarianism, R. G. Frey, assumes that 
such a change would not be beneficial to the majority and thus 
would not be recommended (Probucka 2013, 77). 
In conclusion, Probucka dismisses the notion of animal welfare in favor of the 
more radical notion of animal rights. 
The pivotal and most important part of the book is aimed at 
reconstructing and analyzing different modern concepts and theories of 
animal rights. In her analysis, Probucka refers to a multitude of different 
authors, including Tom Regan, Gary L. Francione, Bernard E. Rollin, Mark 
Rowlands, David DeGrazia, Steve Sapontzis, and others. What is clearly the 
goal of the second chapter, is to introduce different philosophical, legal and 
ethical approaches towards the notion of animal rights. The presented analysis 
prove what is the major value of the book – its comprehensiveness, while 
remaining thorough. While discussing each of the mentioned conceptions of 
animal rights, Probucka does not only resume its main assumptions, but also 
offers a profound insight on the justifications given in favor of different 
concepts and ideas, as well as attempts to discover its general philosophical 
alignment. The almost-encyclopedic effort proves that the work of Dorota 
Probucka does not only verbalize an interesting and inspiring concept on 
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animal rights, developed by Probucka, but also proves to be a balanced and 
unbiased textbook on modern conceptions of animal rights in general. 
The third chapter offers a brief discussion with possible critiques and 
allegations against the notion of animal rights. Probucka reconstructs the 
counterarguments used by Peter Carruthers, Carl Cohen, Raymond Frey, Roger 
Scruton, and others, and tries to reveal their principal points. It is visible, 
however, that the analysis presented in the last chapter lack some profundity: 
Probucka concentrates rather on discovering fallibilities in reasoning of each 
mentioned author, neglecting a more favorable insight in the philosophical 
background of each of the ideas. What is the strong point of the middle part of 
the book: a balanced and thorough analysis, seems to be less present in the 
final chapter, although the general quality of the analysis conducted by 
Probucka remains of highest approval. 
An interesting addition to the analysis, presented in the book, is the 
appendix, consisting of several important legal and philosophical documents 
in favor of animal rights, i.e. UNESCO Universal Declaration of Animal Rights, 
Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, and other. the presence of 
aforementioned documents deepens the general value of the book and proves 
that the discussed issue is not purely theoretical. 
In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing that Philosophical foundations 
of the animal rights concept by Dorota Probucka has two aims: one would be 
to present an interesting voice, added into the discussion on animal rights, 
second to offer a comprehensive guidebook on different concepts of animal 
rights. It should be noted that the authoress achieves a positive result in both 
appointed tasks. Comprehensiveness and thoroughness, accompanied with 
passionate narrative, prove that Dorota Probucka elaborated a difficult and 
vast theme in an impartial and profound manner. Thus, it is possible to say 
that the book by Dorota Probucka will remain an exemplary study in animal 
rights in the Polish philosophical literature. 
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